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Introduction
While ‘preventative detention’ of people with serious personality disorders has not found favour
in Scotland, new legislation recently imposed a public safety test for patients already detained in
hospital. The Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999 was the first Act of
the new Scottish Parliament. It altered the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 by providing that, if
there were public safety concerns, patients with severe anti-social personality disorders could
continue to be detained in hospital even though their condition was not treatable and even if they
were not, in fact receiving treatment. The new legislation has recently survived an ECHR challenge
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
Three restricted patients held in the State hospital at Carstairs challenged the new legislation on
the grounds that it was outside (or in Scotland, ‘outwith’) the competence of the Scottish
Parliament, being contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. The court upheld the
decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session and dismissed the appeals, saying that there
was no requirement in the ECHR that detention in hospital had to be linked to treatment. The new
legislation was a proportionate response to the risk.
Background and facts
In July 1999 Sheriff Douglas Allen granted Noel Ruddle, described as a person with a severe
personality disorder and a danger to the public, an absolute discharge from detention in the State
hospital at Carstairs.1
The sheriff’s decision followed the ruling of the House of Lords in Reid v Secretary of State for
Scotland.2 In that case it was held that a proper reading of s64 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act
(the 1984 Act) had to ‘read into’ the discharge provisions the conditions which applied at a patient’s
initial detention, currently in s17(1) of the 1984 Act. Section 17(1) provides that a patient with anti-
social personality disorder (the Scottish Act does not use the term ‘psychopathy’) can be admitted
to hospital only if treatment will alleviate his or her condition or at least prevent it getting worse.
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In Ruddle’s case the sheriff found that he was receiving very little treatment, other than
containment, and that there was no evidence that medical treatment would improve his condition.
He was, therefore, given an absolute discharge.
When the new Scottish Executive came to power it was advised that this apparent ‘loophole’ in the
1984 Act could lead to the discharge of around a further twelve patients currently detained in the
State hospital. Two such patients, R and A, did, in fact, put in appeals in July 1999. There was
considerable public dismay following Ruddle’s discharge and the Scottish Executive was under
pressure to allay public concerns. 
The first Act of the new Scottish Parliament, was, therefore, an attempt to plug the Ruddle gap.
The 1999 Act was passed in 13 September 1999, just twelve days after the Parliament first met for
business. It inserted a new sub-clause into the appeal provisions. Where a sheriff found that there
were compelling public safety concerns, a patient could not be discharged, even though his or her
mental disorder was untreatable and even though no further treatment was proposed. 
The Act was regarded as a temporary measure, pending the reports of the MacLean Committee
into serious, violent and sexual offenders, including people with personality disorders, and the
Millan Committee, which was reviewing the Mental Health (Scotland) Act. 
All three appellants were long term patients in the State hospital. A and R had been sent to hospital
under hospital orders with restrictions, while D had been transferred to hospital from prison in
Northern Ireland via a restriction direction and later transferred to the State hospital from that
hospital. (Northern Ireland has no high security hospital provision and all patients needing such
provision come to the State hospital.)
All three patients had been diagnosed as suffering from anti-social personality disorders. 
The medical evidence was that such patients would not be sent to the State hospital today, as their
conditions were regarded as untreatable.
A and D applied to the local sheriff for discharge in July 1999. D, being subject to a transfer
direction, applied for discharge from hospital and to complete the remainder of his sentence in
prison. The 1999 Act legislation was retrospective and thus covered D and A, even though they
had put in appeals before it was passed. R, having failed to obtain his discharge from the House of
Lords,3 made a further application to the sheriff for discharge in March 2000. 
The sheriff referred the cases to the Inner House of the Court of Session, which determined that
the legislation was within the Parliament’s powers. The patients appealed to the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council.
Legal provisions
Section 64 of the 1984 Act contains provisions relating to the discharge of restricted patients very
similar to those contained in s73 Mental Health Act 1983. 
Where an appeal to the sheriff is made by a restricted patient who is subject to a restriction order,
the sheriff must direct the absolute discharge of the patient if s/ he is satisfied that the patient is
not suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him/her
to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; or that it is not necessary for the
3 See 2 above. The Lords had held that it was not
appropriate for him to be discharged, as R was receiving
treatment at the State hospital, in the form of anger
management training, which was preventing his
condition from getting worse.
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health or safety of the patient or for the protection of other persons that s/he should receive such
treatment; and (in either case) that it is not appropriate for the patient to remain liable to be
recalled to hospital for further treatment. 
Section 1 of the 1999 Act inserts a new subclause into s64. If an appeal to the sheriff is made by
a restricted patient subject to a restriction order, the sheriff must refuse the appeal if s/he is
satisfied that the patient is, at the time of the hearing of the appeal, suffering from a mental
disorder the effect of which is such that it is necessary, in order to protect the public from serious
harm, that the patient continue to be detained in a hospital, whether for medical treatment or not.
The burden of proof of the matters as to which the sheriff is to be satisfied for the purposes of
this provision is on the Scottish Ministers.
The 1999 Act was challenged on the basis that s1 was contrary to Articles 5.1(e) and 5.4 of the
ECHR and thus outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.
Article 5.1(e)’s terms are as follows:
‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:…(e)
the lawful detention of ………….persons of unsound mind …….’
Article 5.4 states:
‘Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.’ 
Section 29(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that a provision of an Act of the Scottish
Parliament is outwith its legislative competence if, among other things,  ‘it is incompatible with any
of the Convention rights …’.  Convention rights are the rights detailed in section 1 of the Human
Rights Act 19984 and include Article 5 of the ECHR.  Section 29(1) of the Scotland Act states that
‘An Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision of the Act is outside the
legislative competence of the Parliament’. The court is given power to strike such provisions out
of offending legislation.
Questions for the court
Three major questions were considered. 
Firstly, and crucially, was the public safety test in s1 of the Mental Health (Public Safety and
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999 in breach of the ECHR and therefore beyond the competence of the
Scottish Parliament under s29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998? 
Secondly, should the case of D be distinguished from those of A and R? D applied to be returned
to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence of imprisonment and did not seek to be
discharged into the community. The public at large would not be affected by D’s discharge from
the State hospital. Could the ‘public safety’ provisions in the 1999 Act be relevant to D?
Thirdly, was the retrospective application of section 1 to pending proceedings incompatible with
Article 5(4) of the EHCR?
4 Scotland Act 1998, s126(1).
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Judgement
Was the public safety test in breach of the ECHR?
The judges did not agree that the public safety provisions were in breach of Article 5(1)(e). There
was no reference in that Article to detention being for the purposes of treatment and the court
could find no reference in the case law to suggestions that it should be. 
The case law did not make treatment a requirement of detention. The court quoted the conditions
as set out in Winterwerp v The Netherlands.5 These were objective proof of ‘unsound mind’, mental
disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement and the validity of continued
confinement depending upon the persistence of such a disorder. All such requirements were met
in the case of the appellants. Winterwerp did not impose a requirement that treatment be offered or
likely to improve the patient’s condition.
Counsel for the appellants argued that in terms of the second Winterwerp test, confinement could
be ‘appropriate’ only if treatment were to be offered. However the court dismissed this argument.
Public safety concerns could justify confinement whether or not the patient’s condition could be
improved by treatment. In Luberti6 the European Court held that confinement was appropriate and
did not suggest that the second requirement involved consideration of treatment. It was sufficient
that the patient posed a ‘real danger’ at the time of the confinement.
In Ashingdane7 the court stated that article 5(1)(e) was not in principle concerned with whether the
treatment offered to a patient or the conditions under which s/he was detained were suitable.
In Guzzardi v Italy8 the court said that article 5(1)(e):
‘refers to persons of unsound mind, alcoholics and drug addicts. The reason why the
Convention allows the latter individuals ………… to be deprived of their liberty is not only
that they have to be considered as occasionally dangerous for public safety but also that their
own interests may necessitate their detention.’ 
In Litwa v Poland9 the court said that all the categories of people noted in article 5(1)(e) could be
deprived of their liberty ‘either in order to be given medical treatment or ……on both medical and
social grounds’. 
In Johnson v United Kingdom,10 the court recognised that that the release of a person previously
found to present a danger to society ‘is a matter that concerns, as well as that individual, the
community in which he will live if released’. Such discharge should not take place immediately but
the authorities should be able to give consideration to ‘whether the interests of the patient and the
community into which he is to be released would in fact be best served by [the patient’s] discharge.’
The appellants claimed that there must be a relationship between the purpose of the confinement
and the place of confinement.  Confinement in hospital must be to serve the purpose of treatment
and if the condition is not susceptible to treatment then the person should not be confined in a
hospital. In Aerts v Belgium11 the court stated that:
5 (1979) 2 EHRR 387, 403.
6 6 EHRR 440, 449, para 28.
7 7 EHRR 528, 543, para 44.
8 (1980) 3 EHRR 333, 366, para 98.
9 App No 26629/95, 4 April 2000, at paragraph 60.
10 27 EHRR 296, 322, para 62.
11 (1998) 29 EHRR 30, 85, para 46.
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‘there must be some relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied
on and the place and conditions of detention. In principle, the ‘detention’ of a person as a
mental health patient will only be ‘lawful’ for the purposes of sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 1
if effected in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution.’ 
However the Judicial Committee said that the final four words showed that what mattered was that
the place of detention was appropriate. This could be a hospital or some other institution. It did
not follow that detention in the State hospital was inappropriate for the appellants, even although
the purpose was for public safety rather than treatment. 
The court also cited with approval R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal,
North and East London Region.12 In that case Lord Phillips MR expressed the view that once it was
established that a person was of unsound mind the Convention did not link detention in hospital
to treatability. 
The court concluded that it was a matter for domestic law to determine whether deprivation of
liberty in circumstances meeting the Winterwerp criteria should be possible only if the patient was
treatable. Domestic law could also decide the place of detention, so long as this was a place which
was suitable for the detention of persons of unsound mind. The fact that a patient’s mental
disorder was not susceptible to treatment did not mean, in Convention terms, that his or her
continued detention in hospital was arbitrary or disproportionate.
Was the new legislation flawed because of its retrospective nature?
The appellants argued that the new legislation was flawed because it was applied to cases which
were part of the existing legal process. However the court held that, although the Convention did
‘not readily admit’ retrospective legislation, there was no absolute prohibition. Such legislation
must be treated ‘with the greatest possible degree of circumspection’13 and could be justified only
if there were ‘compelling grounds of general interest’.14
The court held that in this case there were such compelling grounds. The risk the Scottish
Parliament faced, of the possibility of successful appeals by up to twelve patients with similar
diagnoses, was real and imminent. The response was proportionate. The test imposed by the new
legislation was a strict one. The sheriff had to be ‘satisfied’ that the conditions of public risk were
met. There must be a risk to the public of ‘serious’ harm. The burden of proof was put on the
Scottish Ministers. 
The court said that, while there was a delicate balance to be drawn between the rights and liberties
of people with mental disorders and the rights of the public to be free from the fear of assault or
injury, it could not be right that public peace and safety should be subordinated to the rights of
people whose disorders rendered them a threat to society. There was nothing in the Convention to
suggest otherwise. 
12 [2001] EWCA Civ 415 (Court of Appeal) 28 March
2001. See commentary in Journal of Mental Health
Law June 2001, p75.
13 See The National & Provincial Building Society v
United Kingdom (1997) 25 EHRR 127, 181, at para
112.
14 Zielinski v France (2001) 31 EHRR 19, at para 57.
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Was the case of D different, in that if his appeal were successful he would be returned to prison?
D argued that it was inadequate drafting of the 1999 legislation which had applied s1 to patients
subject to restriction directions as well as to those subject to restriction orders. He argued that the
second Winterwerp test did not apply in his case, and thus the legislation breached his Convention
rights. If he was right, the section should fall, as it would be outwith the legislative competence of
the Parliament. 
However the court held that the safety of the ‘public’ could apply either to the public at large or
to a section of the public. If D were discharged to prison, he might put the safety of prison officers
or other inmates at risk. The sheriff was, therefore, entitled to find that he posed a risk to the
public. However it followed that if D’s mental condition was not treatable and the Scottish
Ministers were not satisfied it was necessary for him to be detained in hospital to protect a section
of the public from serious harm, D should be transferred back to prison. 
Commentary
The court was influenced in its decision by the decision of the European Court in Koniarska v
United Kingdom.15 The facts were similar. K suffered from a psychopathic disorder which could not
be treated.  The court said that her detention was needed, as there was a danger of her injuring
herself or other persons. It held that there could be said to be both medical and social reasons for
her detention and that this was not in breach of Article 5(1)(e).
While the House of Lords in Reid made it clear that patients with severe personality disorders
could be subject to continued detention in hospital only if there was some possibility of treatment
alleviating their disorder or at least preventing its deterioration, this is now no longer a requirement
in Scotland. Long term containment is now possible and has been held not to be in breach of
ECHR. This may have unfortunate repercussions for the management of such patients’ cases.
Effect on conditional discharge
In Reid Lord Clyde pointed out that conditional discharge, a very useful rehabilitation tool, could
not be available for a patient for whom ‘treatment’ (as defined in the 1984 Act) was unlikely to
provide benefits. Conditional discharge is a possibility only if the sheriff is satisfied that it may be
appropriate to recall the patient to hospital ‘for further treatment’.16 If no treatment is proposed,
other than containment, an attempt at rehabilitation which failed would not allow doctors to recall
the patient to hospital. There is thus a perverse disincentive to attempt such rehabilitation. 
It was pointed out in Reid that a wide definition of ‘medical treatment’ is necessary to give the best
possible likelihood of the conditional discharge option being available. Medical treatment is
defined in s125(1) of the 1984 Act as including nursing, and care and training under medical
supervision. While the term clearly covers medication or other psychiatric treatment designed to
alleviate or to prevent a deterioration of the mental disorder, it can also cover other things which
are done for either of those two purposes under medical supervision. This can include treatment,
such as anger management, which does not treat the disorder itself but alleviates or prevents a
deterioration of the symptoms of the disorder.
15 App No 33670/96), 12 October 2000, (currently
unreported).
16 Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, s64(1)(c).
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Conditional discharge is regarded by forensic psychiatrists as a very useful rehabilitation tool.
With the imposition of the ‘public safety’ test in Scotland, coupled with the implications of the
Reid judgement, it may be less possible to use this for patients in Scotland with untreatable anti-
social personality disorders. We will have to wait to see how this works out in practice.
Burden of proof
It is interesting to note that the 1999 Act specifically states that the burden of proof that a patient
constitutes a serious danger to the public should rest with the Scottish Ministers. This pre-empted
a possible ECHR challenge to the legislation, on the grounds that the patient was being required to
prove his/her safety.17
However the remaining provisions of the section, which require the patient to satisfy the sheriff
that s/he no longer requires treatment, could now be subject to challenge. 
Legislative reform and the future of the provision
The 1999 Act was expressed to be a temporary measure, pending the reports of the Millan
Committee’s review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 and the MacLean Committee’s
review of the sentencing and treatment of sexual and violent offenders, including offenders with
personality disorder. Those Committees have now reported. 
The Millan Committee, which had criticised the new legislation, recommended its repeal, in favour
of new safeguards at the time of sentencing and the greater use of hospital directions,18 which
would ensure that convicted persons whose conditions later proved untreatable could be returned
to prison to complete their sentences. 
However neither Millan nor MacLean could make any recommendation to cover those patients
who were subject to the existing legislation. They could not be transferred to prison (unless, like D,
they were subject to a restriction direction), as they had not received a prison sentence at their trial. 
MacLean recommended that crucial to the proper management of their case was a high standard
of risk assessment to consider their suitability for transfer to less secure facilities. Millan, while
recommending that the legislation be repealed for the future, accepted that there might be a need
for some transitional provisions to retain the provisions of the 1999 Act for this very limited group
of high-risk patients. 
The Scottish Executive is thought unlikely to repeal the 1999 Act as part of its new Mental Health
Bill, expected in the spring. In its policy statement Renewing Mental Health Law (October 2001),
the Executive said that it could not make firm recommendations until the outcome of the Privy
Council case was known.19 However its inclination was to retain the public safety test if a patient
continued to suffer from a mental disorder and to pose a serious risk to the public. 
17 See R (on the application of H) v Mental Health
Review Tribunal, North and East London Region
[2001] EWCA Civ 415 and commentary in Journal of
Mental Health Law, June 2001, p75.
18 Under s.59 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
1995, where a person is convicted on indictment in the
High Court or the Sheriff Court of an offence
punishable by imprisonment, the court may make a
direction authorising his or her detention in hospital in
addition to any sentence of imprisonment which it may
impose. Equivalent provisions are found in s.45A of the
Mental Health Act 1983. Millan conceded that
hospital directions have not been widely used in
Scotland, referring at paragraph 35 of chapter 26 of
their report to a “handful”. Hospital directions are
considered by some to be particularly appropriate for
offenders with personality disorders who may benefit
from treatment in hospital. If treatment is found to be
ineffective, the person can be returned to prison.
19 At para 64.
